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COLD-CHAIN LOGISTICS: A STUDY OF THE DEPARTMENT 







The purpose of this MBA project is to suggest a standardized distribution process 
for the DoD of the Pandemic Influenza vaccine, filling an existing void in the National 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.  Also, this project is intended to foster the 
communication and planning process for vaccine distribution between all stakeholders, 
including the DLA, COCOMs, and regional commanders.  Currently, no DoD pre-
pandemic vaccine distribution plan exists.  This project identifies the essential 
infrastructure assets needed to develop a cold-chain distribution network for vaccine in a 
military application.  Furthermore, the key communication and transportation elements 
needed for successful execution of this network are identified, including a discussion on 
information and vaccine flow through the distribution network.  These ideas are 
organized into a model to provide an easily usable decision-making tool for cold-chain 
network design.  Finally, an example using the model is provided, with PACOM as the 
example area of operation.   
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1. Joint Vision 2020 
It is necessary for acquisition specialists to research and understand the direction 
Department of Defense (DoD) logistics initiatives are headed, so that all recommended 
process improvements can be consistent with, and can integrate with, the future vision of 
the United States military’s top leadership. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently published Joint Vision 2020, in which they 
outlined their vision for the United States military for the next twenty years.  The overall 
goal of the Joint Chiefs in this document is: “The creation of a force that is dominant 
across the full spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, 
preeminent in any form of conflict” (Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, 2000, p. 16).  
In order to achieve “full spectrum dominance,” the Joint Chiefs identify four key 
operational capabilities that must be developed through innovation and technology: 
Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics and Full Dimensional 
Protection.  Figure 1 provides a summary graphic of the four capabilities and how they 




Figure 1.   Joint Vision 2020 Overview  
(From Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, 2000) 
 
“Focused Logistics” is identified as one of the main capabilities of Joint Vision 
2020 and is defined by the Joint Chiefs as “the ability to provide the joint force with the 
right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the 
right quantity across the full range of military operations” (Director of Strategic Plans & 
Policy, 1998, p. 16).  The Joint Chiefs envision the accomplishment of focused logistics 
by the use of real-time, web-based information systems that provide Total Asset 
Visibility to all members of the supply chain (Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, 1998).  
The concept of focused logistics was first introduced in the Joint Vision 2010, the 
predecessor to Joint Vision 2020.  In the Joint Vision 2010 document, a detailed ten-year 
plan for the Department of Defense logistics was laid out; this is referred to as the “Joint 
Logistics Roadmap.”  In Joint Vision 2020, the Joint Logistics Roadmap was still 
addressed and endorsed as a viable plan for execution and as the appropriate course for 
DoD logistics.  Figure 2 provides a graphical overview of focused logistics initiatives 
(Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, 1998). 
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Figure 2.   Focused Logistics Overview 
(From Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, 1998, p. 16) 
 
The Focused Logistics Roadmap is extremely detailed and lengthy, and many of 
the items in it pertain more to warfighting issues such as weapons systems and troop 
movements than to logistics.  However, there is one key item of the Focused Logistics 
Roadmap that will definitely affect medical logistics in the DoD.  Joint Health Services 
Support (JHSS) is one of the six tenets of the Focused Logistics Roadmap.  JHSS calls 
for the formation of the Military Health Service System (MHSS) to provide health 
services to the Armed Forces.  It is positioned as the nation’s benchmark health care 
delivery system for the 21st century—emphasizing readiness, health promotion, and 
managed care for all Armed Service personnel.  The MHSS will be committed to jointly 
face the challenges inherent in a new world order, as well as challenges brought about by 
revolutionary changes in health care.  The mission of MHSS is to provide top-quality 
health services, whenever needed, in support of military operations and to members of 
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the Armed Forces.  As the world’s preeminent military health service system, the MHSS 
is accountable to the American people for support of national security and the health of 
military personnel.  Today and in the future, the MHSS is committed to readiness for 
military operations in a dynamic global environment, provision of top-quality, cost-
effective health care, development of leaders who excel in a changing world, and 
innovative application of new technologies (Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, 1998). 
2. The State of Medical Logistics in the DoD 
The history of medical material management in the DoD dates back to 1850 
(Augustitus & Stevenson, 2000).  Medical logistics within the context of the DoD has 
become a problem of enormous proportions and a costly endeavor.  Within the DoD, 
medical logistics is concerned with providing logistical support of organic medical assets 
to both fixed medical facilities (such as clinics and hospitals) and to operational units 
(such as ships and deployed units).   
A key definition of military logistics is that it allows for acquisition of assets, 
sustainment of forces, distribution of assets in a timely manner, and also for proper 
disposal (Naval Doctrine Publication, 1995).  Sustainment includes the idea that adequate 
logistics support is available for continuous operations with minimal interruptions (Naval 
Doctrine Publication, 1995).  Distribution is the allocation and delivery of goods in a 
manner that will allow for maximum combat effectiveness using supply-chain and 
strategic transportation principles (Naval Doctrine Publication, 1995).    
The DoD medical logistics system of the past did not fully support all of the 
above definitions, which caused leaders to realize that the system needed to change.  In 
the past, medical logistics has been controlled primarily through the federal supply 
system at the depot level.  End-users submitting requisitions were at the mercy of an 
archaic system that was implemented to increase the amount of standardization among all 
services.  This system increased inventory costs and provided minimal standardization 
among product lines or products (Augustitus & Stevenson, 2000). 
DoD inventory management initiatives and efforts were focused on ensuring that 
there was enough war-reserve material available should a major conflict occur during the 
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Cold War.  Within this system, medical materials involve large cost because of the shelf-
life of perishable items, such as pharmaceuticals, and the use of assemblages (standard 
templates of issue) to provide initial supplies for operational units (Augustitius & 
Stevenson, 2000). 
Today, we find the DoD utilizing methods such as Prime Vendor (PV) and 
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) to provide needed medical supplies at a competitive 
price and delivery time.  These initiatives also marked the beginning of a new era in 
medical supply-chain management.  Since there has been a reduction of depot-level 
stock, many outside the medical community, namely at the Combatant Commander 
(COCOM) level, do not have confidence in the sustainment capability and surge capacity 
of Class VIII (medical material) during a major theater war (MTW) or major operations 
other than war (MOOTW) (GAO, 1996).  
A decade ago, business-process efficiency was not the highest priority in the 
DoD, but the situation is changing.  Although the DoD does not have a profit motive or 
competition for market share, its business functions can be very similar to those in the 
private sector; in addition, severe budget constraints have dramatically raised the priority 
level of DoD business-process efficiency.  The gap between DoD and private-sector 
business practices has become increasingly relevant. 
3. 20th Century Pandemics 
Every year, United States citizens die from infections caused by the influenza 
virus.  Influenza and pneumonia were ranked number seven on the list of causes of deaths 
among the United States population in 2000 (CDC/NCHS, 2002).  Usually, the virus kills 
mostly small children, the elderly, and those with existing medical conditions.  However, 
three times in the last 100 years there has been an influenza pandemic, or a world-wide 
epidemic, which affected the United States.  These were caused by new influenza “A” 
virus subtypes that emerged during the 20th century and spread around the world within 
one year of being detected (Gurr, 2006). 
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a. Spanish Influenza 
 The first to affect the United States was the “Spanish Influenza” in 1918-
1919.  The origin of the 1918-1919 pandemic virus is not clear, but it is believed to be 
caused by a type “A” (H1N1) virus (Snacken, Haaheim, & Wood, 1999).  The Spanish 
influenza epidemic caused an estimated 22 million deaths around the world according to 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  Over 12,000 deaths were 
reported in Philadelphia alone in September and October of 1918 (Lynch, 1998).  The 
disease caused a panic in Philadelphia because it hit healthy young adults—accounting 
for half of the reported deaths.  Influenza “A” (H1N1) viruses still circulate today after 
being introduced again into the human population in the 1970s (Gurr, 2006). 
b. Asian Influenza 
 In 1957-1958, there was an influenza pandemic called the “Asian Flu.”  
The Asian influenza was caused by an influenza “A” (H2N2) type virus (Snacken et al., 
1999).  This virus was first identified in China in February 1957 and spread to the United 
States in the summer of the same year.  An estimated 1 million people died worldwide 
from the Asian influenza; 70,000 of those were in the United States.  A world-wide scare 
occurred in April 2005 when this influenza virus strain was mistakenly sent out to 3,747 
laboratories in 18 countries as part of their certification process.  All parties were asked to 
destroy the virus upon receipt (CIDRAP, 2005). 
c. Hong Kong Influenza 
 The “Hong Kong Flu” occurred in 1968-1969 and was caused by an “A” 
(H3N2) type virus (Snacken et al., 1999).  It is estimated that 750,000 people world-wide 
died of the virus, and 34,000 of those deaths occurred in the United States.  Influenza “A” 
(H3N2) viruses still circulate today.  Both the 1957-1958 and 1968-1969 pandemics were 
known to be caused by viruses containing a combination of genes from a human 
influenza virus and an avian influenza virus (Gurr, 2006). 
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d. Avian Influenza 
 The latest recorded (as of this writing) multiple deaths resulting from the 
Avian Influenza “A” (H5N1) occurred in China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and 
Turkey—with over 60 reported human deaths and 140 total cases.  So far, this strain has 
not produced human-to-human infection, but is feared to be a likely pandemic influenza 
of the 21st century. 
4. United States Pandemic Influenza Strategy 
The Homeland Security Council, in November 2005, broadly defined the National 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza in the following statement: 
The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza guides our preparedness 
and response to an influenza pandemic, with the intent of (1) stopping, 
slowing or otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to the United 
States; (2) limiting the domestic spread of a pandemic, and mitigating 
disease, suffering and death; and (3) sustaining infrastructure and 
mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society. (2005, p. 
2) 
Three pillars of the Strategy are derived from this broad statement—including 
Preparedness and Communication, Surveillance and Detection, and Response and 
Containment (Homeland Security Council, 2005).   
In May 2006, the President issued the National strategy for pandemic influenza 
implementation guide that provides a directive framework to the National Strategy and 
assigns preparedness and response tasks to Federal departments and agencies.  The 
Implementation Guide acknowledges that because preparedness for a pandemic requires 
the establishment of infrastructure and capacity, a process that can take years, significant 
steps must be taken to initiate that preparedness.  The Implementation Guide translates 
the National Strategy into over 300 tasks that will allow all Federal departments and 
agencies to fully engage their personnel and resources by taking specific, coordinated 
steps to achieve the goals of the National Strategy (Homeland Security Council, 2006). 
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An influenza pandemic—a novel influenza virus with the ability to infect and be 
passed efficiently among humans—could significantly impair the military’s readiness, 
jeopardize ongoing military operations abroad, and threaten the day-to-day functions of 
the DoD due to a large percentage of sick or absent personnel.  The vulnerability of US 
armed forces to an influenza pandemic was demonstrated during World War I when at 
least 43,000 US service members died (about half of all of the deaths of US service 
members during World War I) due to influenza or influenza-related complications; 
another one million service members were hospitalized, which limited the military’s 
ability to continue ongoing missions (GAO, 2007, p. 1). 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), it is not a question of if, but 
when, another influenza pandemic will occur.  During the peak weeks of an outbreak of a 
severe influenza pandemic, the Homeland Security Council estimates that 40% of the US 
workforce might not be at work due to illness, the need to care for family members who 
are sick, or fear of becoming infected. DoD military and civilian personnel and 
contractors would not be immune; the Department would face an absentee rate similar to 
the rest of the population (GAO, 2007, p. 1).  To address the potential threat of an 
influenza pandemic, as well to follow the guidance of the National Implementation 
Guide, the DoD began its department-wide planning and preparedness efforts. 
The Department of Defense implementation plan for pandemic influenza 
developed from the HSC’s Implementation Guide for the National Strategy, was 
designed to provide guidance and to address key issues within the DoD in regard to 
Pandemic Influenza response planning.  One of the key issues addressed is the scope of 
agency responsibility.  The DoD, during a pandemic influenza event, is responsible for 
the care and well-being of military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contractors, dependents, 
and beneficiaries.  This document also provides a standard set of planning assumptions to 
be employed by all DoD activities when developing policy and plans for pandemic 
influenza (DoD, 2006a). 
The focus of this project is to evaluate the current Pandemic Influenza Strategy of 
the DoD, with particular emphasis on the cold-chain management process of the current 
DoD medical supply chain.  In addition, this project examines emerging processes and 
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technologies in the private sector to determine if industry innovations can be adopted to 
enhance and further streamline the DoD cold chain of pandemic influenza vaccinations.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question: 
How can pre-pandemic influenza vaccine be distributed to military personnel 
while minimizing time and risk factors and ensuring cold-chain integrity? 
2. Secondary Research Questions: 
• How can duplication of effort be minimized by the incorporation of an 
integrated response among the military services and defense agencies? 
• What technologies can be employed to sustain an optimal distribution 
chain for the pandemic influenza vaccine?  
• How can the medical logistics community, the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA), and COCOMs cooperate to implement the new process? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research project will consist of the following steps: 
• Conduct a literature search of books, journal articles, magazines, and 
material from the World Wide Web regarding supply- and cold-chain 
management. 
• Conduct a thorough review of existing cold-chain technologies in the DoD 
and the private sector. 
• Conduct a review of current DoD cold-chain processes and procedures, 
including current pandemic influenza distribution procedures.  
• Prepare a summary and make recommendations. 
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D. SCOPE OF PROJECT 
The audience for this project includes DoD and service-specific policy makers, 
COCOM planning personnel, and DLA personnel.  The main emphasis of this project is 
to analyze the pre-pandemic influenza vaccine distribution strategy for the DoD and 
COCOMs, with the given constraint of cold-chain management concepts.  This project 
addresses the establishment of a pre-pandemic influenza cold-chain network, leveraging 
the inherent capabilities of each stakeholder. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Following the project introduction in Chapter I, Chapter II contains data gathered 
from an extensive literature review used to survey the background of supply-chain and 
cold-chain management.  Chapter III provides a detailed analysis of the evolution of DoD 
pandemic influenza policy and strategy.  The key aspect of this chapter is to trace the 
mandate for pre-pandemic influenza vaccine distribution.  Chapter IV develops a decision 
process for cold-chain logistics design in a responsive military environment.  Chapter V 
wraps up the project with discussion of the generalization of the decision process from 
Chapter IV, conclusions, and further recommendations. 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The primary benefit of this study is to create a distribution strategy for the DoD of 
a Pandemic Influenza vaccine, filling an existing void in the National Strategy.  Also, this 
project is intended to foster the communication and planning process between all 
stakeholders, including the DLA, COCOMs, and regional commanders.  Currently, no 
vaccine distribution plan exists.  The intent here is to recommend such a plan and a 
model for decision-making in relation to cold-chain management within a theatre of 




II. EVOLUTION OF THE SUPPLY-CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON COLD-CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter focuses on supply-chain management, which has gained popularity 
in the civilian sector as a valuable tool for improving efficiency in logistics and for 
increasing productivity.  This chapter also discusses the evolving concept of cold-chain 
management—with particular emphasis on maintaining required temperature and 
validation.  It presents an overview of both supply-chain management and cold-chain 
management and how each has become an important management tool in many 
industries. 
B. SUPPLY-CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
Over the past two decades, supply-chain management has grown into a popular 
management tool in industries that rely on manufacturing, production, and distribution 
functions, such as food retailing, the DoD, and the automotive industry.  Increased 
competition and globalization have caused companies to place a greater emphasis on the 
efficiency and responsiveness of their supply functions (Kelly, Morledge, & Wilkinson, 
2002, p. 201). 
Prior to supply-chain management, manufacturing companies focused their 
competitive strategy on providing a product and brand name that people would associate 
with quality.  Very few leaders and top managers of companies were worried about the 
details of the logistics involved in how raw materials were purchased, received, and 
warehoused.  As long as the production line was moving and products were being made 
at a sufficient rate to meet demand, the details of managing supplies were important, but 
usually delegated to the logisticians in a company.  Focus on the actual manufacturing of 
the product was important to the top management of a company, but the follow-on 
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logistics of warehousing the finished products and moving the manufactured product to 
its purchasers were, again, delegated to lower management. 
Traditional corporations, prior to supply-chain management, maintained separate 
departments that were, for the most part, independent of one another.  For example, 
companies would have departments for marketing, purchasing, manufacturing, and 
distribution.  These departments usually had different objectives, which did not always 
mirror and complement one another.  Also, each department placed focus on its portion 
of the business, without emphasizing the overall company process.  This mindset created 
efficiently run departments within the company, but not necessarily the most efficient 
system for the company as a whole. 
While the companies in this era were still concerned about cost, they were more 
focused on finding a savings in the production of their merchandise, and not necessarily 
in the warehousing and the internal logistics associated with the production.  The typical 
logistics manager of the 70’s and early 80’s was concerned with ensuring that production 
was sufficient to meet the demand, and it was common practice to accept the fact that 
hidden costs would creep into the logistics system; these hidden costs would be tolerated 
by the company (Oliver & Webber, 1982).  Therefore, waste and inefficiencies in the 
supply system were generally viewed and accepted as necessary costs for doing business; 
for the most part, the markets allowed it because everyone did it. 
The recent boom in the use of internet and computer technology has ushered in 
the new era of globalization, causing the entire marketplace to change.  With the birth of 
globalization came the growth of competition.  Quality was now something that was 
assumed and expected by an increasingly demanding and knowledgeable customer.  
Therefore, making a quality, brand-name product was no longer a guarantee for success; 
those companies who wanted competitive advantage in the global economy had to find a 
new way to achieve it. 
The growth of globalization and increased competition caused many changes in 
the manufacturing industry.  Firms were now looking for a way to gain a competitive 
advantage in this new marketplace.  Those companies who were able to apply technology 
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and effective management to their entire supply process, from raw materials to delivery 
of the end-product to the client, gained a competitive advantage.  This new advantage 
first demanded the breakdown of cultural and organizational barriers that existed among 
the various individual departments in the company.  Secondly, the company had to insure 
that everyone viewed the process as a system of interlinked organizations working 
together under a common strategy, for a common purpose, and for the same goals. 
The companies who were able to successfully map and efficiently manage their 
supply chains gained a competitive advantage over others in their industry.  This led to an 
increase in the level of competition in their respective industries.  The increased 
competition, in turn, caused more companies to place emphasis on their supply chains in 
order to stay competitive in their industry, which led to the widespread growth and 
popularity of supply-chain management. 
One leading company that has leveraged the latest in information technology to 
develop their supply-chain competitive advantage is Wal-Mart.  Wal-Mart was able to 
develop an efficient supply chain by developing automated links with its multitude of 
suppliers.  Through the use of barcode technology, the suppliers are automatically 
notified in real-time when one of their items is sold at Wal-Mart.  The supplier then 
knows the remaining inventory at the store and knows when to provide a re-supply.  This 
system of VMI created strategic relationships with suppliers and allowed Wal-Mart to 
gain efficiencies, which it could, in turn, pass along to the customers in the form of 
“everyday low prices.”  K-Mart, the main competitor of Wal-Mart, tried to match Wal-
Mart in prices to remain competitive in the industry, but did not have the same 
efficiencies in their supply chain.  This was ultimately a contributing factor to K-Mart 
declaring bankruptcy in 2002 (Bradley & Ghemawat, 2002). 
Throughout the evolution and growth of the supply-chain management concept, 
there have been many definitions of what is included in a supply chain.  The following 
definition by Ganeshan and Harrison (1995) provides a concise and inclusive explanation 
of a supply chain: 
a network of facilities and distribution options that performs the functions 
of  procurement of materials, transformation of these materials into 
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intermediate and  finished products, and the distribution of these finished 
products to customers.  Supply chains exist in both service and 
manufacturing organizations, although the complexity of the chain may 
vary greatly from industry to industry and firm to firm. (p. 1) 
Supply-chain management has become a complex subject, with many companies 
mapping and monitoring their complex, sometimes global, supply chains.  Figure 3 
provides a simplified, generic illustration of the basic supply chain for the manufacturing 
industry (Jones & Riley, 1985).  This figure illustrates how the entire process, from raw 
materials to finished products, is taken into consideration in supply-chain management. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Generic Manufacturing Supply Chain 
(From Jones & Riley, 1985) 
 
C. WHAT IS A COLD CHAIN  
A cold chain is a temperature-controlled supply chain (“Cold Chain,” 2007).  A 
wide variety of food, pharmaceutical, and chemical products are degraded by improper 
exposure to temperature, humidity, light or particular contaminants.  Some products, such 
as pharmaceuticals, require more than a simple cold chain.  Such products require end-to-
end management and visibility of the required temperature parameters.  The Cold Chain 
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Program Manager for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Supply Center 
Philadelphia (DSCP), defines cold-chain management as follows:  
Cold Chain Management is the science of preparing medical temperature 
sensitive products for shipment utilizing approved systems and 
procedures, ensuring that required temperatures are maintained throughout 
the supply chain and the validation of those conditions are met during all 
phases of distribution until issue or administration. (2007, p. 4) 
Two principle tenets are taken from this definition: the maintenance of the required 
temperature and validation of operating conditions.  These two important aspects are 
accomplished through the combination of technology and protocols. 
D. MILITARY COLD CHAIN 
 In 1998, the military lost over 200,000 doses of anthrax vaccine due to freezing in 
an inadequate cold chain (DLA, 2007a).  This, coupled with other high loss rates of 
vaccines, spurred the military to develop a cold-chain management system.  The DLA 
utilizes a simple passive container system, while heavily leveraging standardized, proven, 
and externally validated protocols, knowledgeable personnel, fast transit time, and 
dependable and accurate temperature-monitoring devices.  Passive containers utilize 
insulation and gel packs to provide cooling.  No hazardous refrigerants or power sources 
are needed.   
The Endurotherm system is the insulated shipping container (ISC) and polar pack 
refrigerant of choice for the DLA.  The combination of container, insulation, and 
refrigerant seen below is validated to maintain the required 2°C - 8°C (36°F - 46°F) 
temperature for 72 hours, exceeding current shipping contract times (Dallas,1 personal 
communication, May 24, 2007).    
 
                                                 
1 Dana Dallas is the Cold Chain Program Manager for DLA at DSCP.   
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Figure 4.   Endurotherm Package 
(From DLA, 2007a) 
 
The ISC unit is available in four sizes, while the gel packs are limited to two 
sizes.  The exact sizes available and their specifications are listed in the Appendix.  Each 
unit is packaged according to one of three standard protocols based on the following 






Product and TempTale Temperature 
Monitor inside the fiberboard box 








Figure 5.   Endurotherm (ISC) Box Packing Steps 
(From “Packing protocols,” 2007) 
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According to DMMonline, the basic packing protocols are the same, regardless of 
container size.  The primary difference, as noted in the diagram, is in the specific number 
and relative temperature of gel refrigerant packs used. The expected temperature in the 
receiving region will determine the specific number and relative temperature of gel 
refrigerant packs used.  Expected receiving temperature is divided into three categories: 
Cold, Moderate, and Warm.  Based on temperature categories and box sizes available, the 
DLA only utilizes 12 unique packaging protocols for its entire cold-chain management 
system. 
 The last essential element in the military cold chain is temperature monitoring and 
verification. The DLA accomplishes this vital step with the use of a Temptale 
temperature monitor, produced by Sensitech.  This device will record unit temperature for 
the duration of the transit, and one can download the record to a computer upon receipt to 
verify proper temperature control was maintained.  A graphical output, as shown below, 
is one of the available reports from Temptale technology (DLA, 2007a).  This example 
report displays temperature vs. time since the device was initialized, providing valuable 
verifiable information. 
 
Figure 6.   Temptale Temperature Monitor Readout 
(From DLA, 2007a) 
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E. COLD-CHAIN TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 
Cold-chain management can vary greatly in level of complexity. Sensorlogic, 
Inc., provides an example below of a completely integrated and highly sophisticated cold 
chain.  Such a system allows for product visibility throughout the cold chain by 
monitoring with radio frequency identification (RFID) and global positioning satellites 
(GPS), interconnected through a common computer network.  All stakeholders have 
access to exact real-time temperature and location information on demand (Deloitte, 
2007). 
 
Figure 7.   Example of an Intelligent Cold-Chain 








 Technological advances in cold-chain management are not limited to tracking and 
computer systems.  Several companies have made great leaps in the transport and storage 
arena.  One such example is from Carrier Transport, Refrigeration Container, & Power 
Generation division. Carrier has developed the LINE product family. Its most advanced 
system provides for full atmospheric control, integrated RFID, GPS, and satellite 
communication, and multiple safety and security sensors (Carrier, 2007).  A system such 
as this is known as an active system due to its use of refrigerants and power sources.  
 
Figure 8.   Carrier’s Advanced Cold-Chain 
(From Carrier, 2007) 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the management of products requiring refrigeration 
during transportation and distribution.  Also discussed was the evolving concept of cold-
chain management—with particular emphasis on maintaining required temperature and 
validation. The commercial technology discussed in this section is highly advanced; 
however, it requires a large infrastructure investment which can be cost prohibitive.  
None of these technologies have been through the military acquisition process or have 
been validated for shipping aboard military transport (Dallas, personal communication, 
May 24, 2007).  Finally, this chapter investigated some of the available technology for 
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III. EXISTING POLICIES 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter focuses on policies that have been implemented by the federal 
government to prepare our nation to fight an influenza pandemic.  This chapter will also 
discuss in detail how these policies affect and mandate DoD pandemic influenza 
planning, while paying specific attention to the mandate of a transportation/distribution 
plan of vaccines and antivirals.   
B. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
On November 1, 2005, President George W. Bush approved the National Strategy 
for Pandemic Influenza with the following statement: 
Once again, nature has presented us with a daunting challenge:  the 
possibility of an influenza pandemic.  A new strain of influenza virus has 
been found in birds in Asia, and has shown that it can infect humans.  If 
this virus undergoes further change, it could very well result in the next 
human pandemic.  We have an opportunity to prepare ourselves, our 
Nation, and our world to fight this potentially devastating outbreak of 
infectious disease.  The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza presents 
our approach to address the threat of pandemic influenza, whether it 
results from the strain currently in birds in Asia or another influenza virus.  
The Strategy outlines how we intend to prepare for, detect, and respond to 
a pandemic.  It also outlines the important roles to be played not only by 
our federal government, but also by the state and local governments, 
private industry, our international partners, and most importantly 
individual citizens, including you and your families.  While your 
government will do much to prepare for a pandemic, individual action and 
individual responsibility are necessary for the success of any measures.  
Not only should you take action to protect yourself and your families, you 
should also take action to prevent the spread of influenza if your or anyone 
in your family becomes ill.  Together we will confront this emerging 
threat and together, as Americans, we will be prepared to protect our 
families, our communities, this great Nation, and our world. (Homeland 
Security Council, 2005, p. i) 
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These strong words shared by the President obviously make a pandemic a unique 
circumstance—necessitating a strategy that extends well beyond health and medical 
boundaries, to include the sustainment of critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, 
the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and 
security considerations. 
 The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza guides the nation’s preparedness 
and response to an influenza pandemic, with the intent of: 
1. Stopping, slowing or otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to the 
United States. 
2. Limiting the domestic spread of a pandemic, and mitigating disease, suffering 
and death. 
3. Sustaining infrastructure and mitigating impact to the economy and the 
functioning of society. (Homeland Security Council, 2005, p. 2) 
With the intent of a broad strategy, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza relies 
on three fundamental pillars to accomplish this intent. 
1. Pillars of the National Strategy 
The pillars of the National Strategy are detailed in the sections below: 
• Preparedness and Communication: Activities that should be undertaken before 
a pandemic to ensure preparedness and the communication of roles and 
responsibilities to all levels of government, segments of society and 
individuals. 
• Surveillance and Detection:  Domestic and international systems that provide 
continuous “situational awareness,” to ensure the earliest warning possible to 
protect the population. 
• Response and Containment:  Actions to limit the spread of the outbreak and to 
mitigate the health, social and economic impact of a pandemic. (Homeland 
Security Council, 2005, p. 3) 
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a. Pillar One:  Preparedness and Communication 
Preparedness is the underpinning of the entire spectrum of activities, 
including surveillance, detection, containment and response efforts.  The purpose of this 
pillar is to ensure support of pandemic planning efforts, and to clearly communicate 
expectations to individuals, communities and governments (whether overseas or in the 
United States), recognizing that all share the responsibility to limit the spread of infection 
and, thus, protect populations beyond their borders (Homeland Security Council, 2005, p. 
4).  The following fundamental concepts construct Pillar One: 
1. Planning for a Pandemic 
2. Communicating Expectations and Responsibilities 
3. Producing and Stockpiling Vaccines, Antivirals, and Medical 
Material 
4. Establishing Distribution Plans for Vaccines and Antivirals 
5. Advanced Scientific Knowledge and Accelerating 
Development (Homeland Security Council, 2005, pp. 4-6) 
b. Pillar Two:  Surveillance and Detection 
Early warning of a pandemic and the ability to closely track the spread of 
avian influenza outbreaks is critical to ensure rapid employment of resources to contain 
the spread of the virus.  An effective surveillance and detection system will save lives by 
allowing the US to activate response plans before the arrival of a pandemic virus to the 
US, to activate additional surveillance systems, and to initiate vaccine production and 
administration (Homeland Security Council, 2005, p. 7).  The following fundamental 
concepts construct Pillar Two: 
1. Ensuring Rapid Reporting of Outbreaks 
2. Using Surveillance to Limit Spread (Homeland Security 
Council, 2005, p. 7) 
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c. Pillar Three:  Response and Containment 
The US recognizes that a virus with pandemic potential anywhere 
represents a risk to populations everywhere.  Once health authorities have signaled that 
sustained and efficient human-to-human spread of the virus has occurred, a cascade of 
response mechanisms will be initiated from the site of the documented transmission to 
locations around the globe (Homeland Security Council, 2005, p. 8).  The following 
fundamental concepts construct Pillar Three: 
1. Containing Outbreaks 
2. Leveraging National Medical and Public Health Surge 
Capacity 
3. Sustaining Infrastructure, Essential Services and the Economy 
4. Ensuring Effective Risk Communication (Homeland Security 
Council, 2005, pp. 8-9) 
2. Implications of the Pillars 
The pillars of this strategy only reflect the federal government’s approach to the 
pandemic threat.  While the Strategy provides tactical direction for the departments and 
agencies of the US government, it does not attempt to catalogue and assign all federal 
responsibilities.  Of particular interest to our project is the Pillar One concept that 
expresses the need for establishing distribution plans for vaccines and antivirals.  The 
Homeland Security Council (2005) specifically addresses that it is essential for the US to 
prioritize the allocation of countermeasures (vaccines and antivirals) that are in limited 
supply and to define effective distribution procedures during a pandemic (p. 5).  
C. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
In May 2006, President George W. Bush signed the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan with the following personal remarks: 
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On November 1, 2005, I announced the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza, a comprehensive approach to addressing the threat of pandemic 
influenza.  Our strategy outlines how we are preparing for, and how we 
will detect and respond to, a potential pandemic. Building upon these 
efforts, the Implementation Plan (Guide) for the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza ensures that our efforts and resources will be brought 
to bear in a coordinated manner against this threat.  The plan describes 
more than 300 critical actions, many of which have already been initiated, 
to address the threat of pandemic influenza.  Our efforts require the 
participation of, and coordination by, all levels of government and 
segments of society. State and local governments must be prepared, and 
my Administration will work with them to provide the necessary guidance 
in order to best protect their citizens.  No less important will be the actions 
of individual citizens, whose participation is necessary to the success of 
these efforts.  Our Nation will face this global threat united in purpose and 
united in action in order to best protect our families, our communities, our 
Nation, and our world from the threat of pandemic influenza. (Homeland 
Security Council, 2006, p. i) 
It is evident that the presence of a strategy does not ensure success, particularly since 
Strategy must be translated into tangible actions that fully engage the breadth of the 
federal government.  The implementation plan provides a common frame of reference for 
understanding the pandemic threat and summarizes key planning considerations for all 
partners.  It also requires that federal departments and agencies take specific, coordinated 
steps to achieve the goals of the Strategy and outlines expectations of stakeholders in the 
US and abroad. 
1. Implementation Plan Structure 
The implementation guide for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
further clarifies the roles and responsibilities of governmental and non-governmental 
entities— including federal, state, local, and tribal authorities and regional, national, and 
international stakeholders—and provides preparedness guidance for all segments of 
society.  The plan addresses the following topics: 
• Chapters 2 and 3 (US Government Planning and Response) 
• Chapters 4 and 5 (International Efforts and Transportation and Borders) 
• Chapter 6 (Protecting Human Health) 
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• Chapter 7 (Protecting Animal Health) 
• Chapter 8 (Law Enforcement, Public Safety, and Security) 
• Chapter 9 (Institutional Considerations) 
The implementation plan represents a comprehensive effort by the federal government to 
identify the critical steps that must be taken immediately and over the coming months and 
years to address the threat of an influenza pandemic.  It assigns specific responsibilities to 
federal departments and agencies, and includes measures of progress and timelines for 
implementation to ensure that we meet our preparedness objectives (Homeland Security 
Council, 2006, pp. vii-viii). 
2. DoD-specific Transportation Responsibilities 
The first priority of DoD support, in the event of a pandemic, will be to provide 
sufficient personnel, equipment, facilities, materials, and pharmaceuticals to care for DoD 
military and civilian personnel, dependents, and beneficiaries to protect and preserve the 
operational effectiveness of our forces throughout the globe (Homeland Security Council, 
2006, p. 52).  Specifically, from Chapter Six of the national implementation guide the 
DoD has mandated the following transportation responsibilities: 
1. Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication (6.1.6.3):                             
DoD, as part of its departmental implementation plan, shall conduct a medical 
requirements gap analysis and procure necessary material to enhance military 
health system sure capacity within 18 months.  Measure of performance:  gap 
analysis completed and necessary material procured. (Homeland Security 
Council, 2006, p. 119) 
2. Pillar One:  Preparedness and Communication (6.1.7.4):                              
DoD shall establish stockpiles of vaccine against H5N1 and other influenza 
subtypes determined to represent a pandemic threat adequate to immunize 
approximately 1.35 million persons for military use within 18 months of 
availability.  Measure of performance:  sufficient vaccine against each 
influenza virus determined to represent a pandemic threat in DoD stockpile to 
vaccinate 1.35 million persons. (Homeland Security Council, 2006, p. 120) 
3. Pillar One:  Preparedness and Communication (6.1.13.4):                           
DoD, in coordination with Health and Human Services and Veterans Affairs, 
and in collaboration with state, local and tribal governments and private sector 
partners, shall assist in the development of distribution plans for medical 
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countermeasure stockpiles to ensure that delivery and distribution algorithms 
have been planned.  Measure of performance:  distribution plans developed. 
(Homeland Security Council, 2006, p. 122) 
4. Pillar One:  Preparedness and Communication (6.1.13.8):                           
DoD shall supply military units and posts, installations, bases, and stations 
with vaccine and antiviral medications according to the schedule of priorities 
listed in the DoD pandemic influenza policy and planning guidance, within 18 
months.  Measure of performance:  vaccine and antiviral medications 
procured; DoD policy guidance developed on the use and release of vaccine 
and antiviral medications; and worldwide distribution drill completed. 
(Homeland Security Council, 2006, p. 123) 
Given the highly distributed nature of a pandemic, the need to deliver vaccines and 
antivirals quickly presents significant logistical challenges, many of which may be 
unresolved.  It is necessary to develop and exercise pandemic influenza countermeasure 
distribution plans in each of the states and territories, as well as to construct public-
private partnerships to ensure the seamless, efficient, and timely distribution of these 
countermeasures (Homeland Security Council, 2006, p. 107). 
3. Summary 
Managing transportation and distribution decisions in a pandemic will require 
extraordinary cooperation between the varied and diverse organizations of each sector.  
In many cases, decision-makers will be simultaneously managing complex and 
competing interests.  State and local governments, for example, acting within their 
authorities, may impose restrictions or closures of transportation systems without 
consulting or coordinating with federal entities; this clearly would have considerable 
impact on efforts to move critical pharmaceuticals or essential supplies.  It is, therefore, 
evident that the DoD must enact a specific pandemic influenza response plan to ensure 
successful countermeasure transport in the event of an influenza pandemic. 
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D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
The Implementation Guide for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
provides guidance for federal departments and agencies to implement preparedness and 
response tasks for a pandemic influenza outbreak.  In response, the Department of 
Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza was issued in August of 2006, to 
provide planning and implementation guidance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
COCOMs, Military Departments, and DoD agencies.  In the document’s conclusion, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense states, “It is imperative that DoD 
develop policies and plans that provide for an active, layered defense and coordinate with 
our federal partners to ensure that governments at all levels domestically and abroad are 
prepared to face a pandemic threat” (DoD, 2006a, p. 18). 
The Secretary of Defense’s principle responsibility in responding to a pandemic is 
to protect US interests at home and abroad.  This DoD-specific Implementation Plan sets 
forth DoD guidance and addresses key policy issues for pandemic influenza planning.  
This guidance will enable the Combatant Commander, Military Services, and DoD 
agencies to develop plans to prepare for, detect, respond to, and contain the effects of a 
pandemic on military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contractors, dependents, and 
beneficiaries (DoD, 2006a, p. 3). 
1. DoD-specific Transportation Responsibilities 
Annex (A) of the Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic 
Influenza lists all National plan action numbers assigned to the DoD in the National 
implementation guide. There are 114 total tasks, 31 of which are to be primarily enacted 
by the DoD.  Of the four specific transportation tasks the DoD was tasked with in the 
National implementation plan, the DoD was mandated as the lead agency on the 
following three:  (1) 6.1.6.3; (2) 6.1.7.4; and (3) 6.1.13.8, and was assigned as a support 
agency on 6.1.13.4.  Annex (A) also delineates the Office of Primary Responsibility 
(OPR) for various activities.  OPRs will coordinate all actions with all appropriate offices  
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within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, COCOM, Military Services, 
and DoD agencies.  Specifically, the following transportation action plan numbers were 
assigned to the following OPRs: 
1. 6.1.6.3:  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense 
2. 6.1.7.4:  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 
3. 6.1.13.8:  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 
4. 6.1.13.4:  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 
(Department of Defense, 2006)  
2. Summary 
The four specific transportation tasks passed to the DoD are currently in the 
planning process.  After extensive research, including numerous phone conversations 
with the applicable Offices of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, we concluded that 
these offices are currently in the planning process, but nothing has been officially 
promulgated in writing. 
E. COMBATANT COMMANDER’S ROLE 
Though the Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza 
was originated from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it is merely a policy tool that 
is intended to guide the planning process for the Joint Staff and, ultimately, each 
COCOM (DoD, 2006a).  As operational commanders, the DoD’s COCOMs are an 
essential part of the Department’s pandemic influenza planning.  There are currently nine 
COCOMs—five with geographic responsibilities and four with functional 
responsibilities.  To ensure proper pandemic planning, it is paramount that COCOMs 
have lines of communication that stretch well beyond operational responsibilities.  In a 
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, numerous challenges were 
identified that hindered the planning and preparedness efforts of COCOMs (GAO, 2007).  
Specifically germane to our project, the GAO found that limited detailed guidance from 
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other federal agencies on the support expected from the DoD, lack of control over the 
DoD’s stockpile of antivirals, and reliance on military services for medical material 
caused some of the biggest planning obstacles (GAO, 2007, p. 8).   
Planning officials from three COCOMs and two service subcomponents recently 
stated, “Planning to provide support at the last minute could lead to a less effective and 
less efficient use of resources” (GAO, 2007, p. 8).  Though it is difficult to plan for an 
influenza pandemic and to mitigate the effects of factors that are beyond their control, the 
COCOMs’ ability to protect their personnel and perform their missions during an 
influenza pandemic may be at risk.  The GAO gives the following example: if a nation 
decides to close its borders at the start of a pandemic, the COCOMs and the installations 
for which they are responsible may not be able to obtain needed supplies, such as 
vaccines and antivirals (GAO, 2007, p. 8). 
1. Transportation/Distribution Issues 
Planning officials from eight of the nine COCOMs expressed concern that their 
headquarters are tenants of military services’ installations and, therefore, are reliant on 
the military services to distribute medical material and other supplies (GAO, 2007, p. 36).  
This factor has hindered the COCOMs’ ability to fully address how their headquarters 
will receive medical material and other supplies during an influenza pandemic.  Medical 
and planning officials on two COCOMs’ staffs expressed concern with the variance 
among the military services’ health-related policies and priorities.  For example, each 
military service has a different doctrine or policy on pandemic influenza-related health 
issues, such as the distribution of vaccines, antivirals, and other drugs (GAO, 2007, p. 
36).  Although guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD 
HA) is the same for all of the military services, it is applied differently among each 
service.  In itself, this may be appropriate.  However, certain differences in application of 
the guidance could have adverse consequences.  For example, medical and planning 
officials from four of the COCOMs’ staffs noted that the military services would 
determine how vaccines and antivirals would be used because these supplies would be 
provided through the military services (GAO, 2007, p. 36).  This variance in policy 
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implementation could lead to different preparedness levels and could limit the operational 
control that COCOMs would have during a pandemic, which would directly impair their 
ability to carry out their missions. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter explored the evolutionary process of why and how a National 
Pandemic Influenza (PI) Strategy was formed.  The chapter specifically traced the DoD's 
fundamental need and requirement of a PI distribution strategy, gave a glimpse into the 
planning of that distribution strategy, as well as identified the stakeholders in the DoD's 
policy.  Finally, it highlighted the fundamental communication and execution 
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IV. DISTRIBUTION MODEL 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a pre-pandemic influenza vaccine 
distribution model.  The goal of the model is to provide a framework for joint asset 
utilization, cold-chain management, and decision-making in regard to logistics.  Also 
included in this chapter is a discussion as to the execution of this model.  
This chapter will use the Pacific Command (PACOM) regions of Japan and South 
Korea, shown in the following map (Figure 9), as the example area of responsibility 
(AOR) for application of this model.  PACOM has been selected due to the current level 
of reported H5N1 cases; the highest concentration and number of human avian influenza 
cases has been reported in Southeast Asia (WHO, 2007, July 27).  This discussion has 
been further limited to the countries of Japan and South Korea because of the high 
concentration of US military forces in those locations; a focus on these locations also 
serves to limit the scope of this study in order to provide a reasonable illustration within 
the time and resources available for us.  The final assumption of this model is that 
operational assets will be utilized in such a manner as to provide joint logistics and 
transportation throughout the AOR.  
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Figure 9.   Example AOR 
(After Constructed using Google Earth) 
 
B. STOCKPILE TO AOR TRANSPORTATION 
 The first decision to be considered here is the means of shipment of vaccine to the 
AOR.  Currently, the DoD’s preferred method of shipment for medical supplies, 
including cold-chain items, is via contracted commercial vendors such as FedEx 
(Battaglia,2 personal communication, August 2, 2007). These carriers provide the rapid 
transportation times needed for passive cold-chain containers.  This shipping preference 
is further cemented in the Under Secretary for Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
[USD (P&R)] Policy for the Release of Tamiflu Antiviral Stockpile during an Influenza 
Pandemic (2006): 
                                                 
2  Peter Battaglia is the Medical Material Executive Agent Troop Support Planner for Defense Supply 
Center Philadelphia. 
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Upon ASD (HA) approval, DSCP will implement Tamiflu shipment in 
support of mission-critical priorities in coordination with U.S. 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), with the goal of global delivery 
within 48 hours.  Should the usual modes of DSCP logistics support be 
inadequate, TRANSCOM will be tasked with delivery of CONUS DSCP 
storage depots to designated CONUS locations, while Geographical 
COCOMs may be similarly tasked for delivery within their respective 
areas of responsibility (p. 2). 
While the USD (P&R) clearly states that normal modes of DSCP logistics support 
are the preference for distribution, this is contrary to the DoD Implementation Plan.  The 
following planning assumption is stated in the DoD Implementation Plan: “Civilian 
commercial air carriers will be impacted seriously and cannot be relied upon to provide 
support to DoD. The civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) will not be activated by DoD” (2006a, 
p. 62).  However, the commercial vendors that participate in CRAF are essential to the 
first step in a successful distribution of vaccines.  The mission of CRAF is to support 
DoD airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capability 
of military aircraft (US Congressional Research Service, 2006, p. 4).  Due to current 
DLA practice, cold-chain medical supply distribution is not a mission military assets are 
routinely used to completing (Battaglia, personal communication, August 2, 2007).  By 
not utilizing commercial carriers in a pandemic situation, the DoD could greatly impact 
its ability to provide essential and timely support to troops worldwide.    The CRAF 
mission, coupled with current practices and areas of expertise, makes commercial carriers 
the transportation means recommended for the Continental United States (CONUS) 
stockpile to AOR in this distribution model.  Use of commercial carriers can be 
accomplished through current contract agreements or through the activation of CRAF. 
C. AOR DISTRIBUTION HUB SELECTION 
 With the selection of a CONUS-to-AOR transportation means, an AOR entry 
point/distribution hub must be chosen.  Decision-makers must take several factors into 
consideration when selecting this location.  According to Applebaum, both the product 
requirements, such as storage and handling, and area requirements, such as distribution 
channels and infrastructure, must be evaluated (2007, p. 57).  The following key 
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parameters have been selected for evaluation for this model: military airfield availability, 
cold-chain training level, cold-chain repacking supplies availability, cargo aircraft 
assignment, and helicopter availability. 
 Military airfield availability.  According to the Under Secretary of State for 
Democracy and Global Affairs, Paula J. Dobriansky, a worst-case scenario of pandemic 
influenza could bring international trade to a standstill and create great social and 
political instability (2006).  Such a scenario could greatly inhibit the ability of the United 
States government to support military personnel stationed overseas.  To minimize the 
possible effects of foreign government infrastructure on this distribution model, only 
military airfields would be considered as points of entry to the AOR.  It is assumed these 
airfields would be capable of receiving commercial aircraft and handling their cargo. 
 Cold-chain Infrastructure Aspects.  Once the pre-pandemic vaccine has arrived at 
the AOR distribution hub, bulk breaking and proper cold repacking would be required.  
Proper interim active storage and subsequent repacking is essential in maintaining the 
integrity of the cold chain and the effectiveness of the vaccine.  According to Mike 
Minto3 and Dana Dallas, the current cold-chain packing regulation, DLAR 4145.21, is 
outdated and does not ensure proper cold-chain controls (Minto, personal 
communication, July 19, 2007).  A revision of DLAR 4145.21 is being routed for 
approval.  In the interim, selected locations have been trained based on the new draft 
regulation.  Communication with the DLA by the COCOM staff is essential in identifying 
these properly trained locations in the AOR of concern.  For this example, the AOR asset 
matrix below is annotated with the properly cold-chain trained and supplied locations 
available today. 
 Military Airlift Availability (Cargo Aircraft/Helo).  The same resultant 
instabilities that necessitate the exclusive use of military airfields also impact the ability 
to distribute vaccine out of the distribution hub.  Secure and dependable transportation 
methods must be selected to move vaccine farther into the AOR.  The most controllable 
and dependable large-scale transportation method for this model is military airlift.  Airlift 
                                                 
3 Mike Minto is the Supervisor Supply Management Spec. Accountability Support, DDC-J3/J4-TPP. 
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is required both to travel the distances involved in a large AOR, as well as to minimize 
transportation time to ensure the passive cold-chain containers in use are able to maintain 
proper environmental controls for their vaccine cargo.  Exclusive use of military airlift in 
the AOR reduces the impact of foreign government, public, and infrastructure 
instabilities that may be present during a pandemic.  
 




Supplies Cargo Aircraft Helos 
Japan 
Misawa Air Base (AB) X         
Atsugi Naval Air Facility X     X (C-2 deploy) X 
Yokosuka/Yokota  AB X X X X (C-130, C-21) X 
Iwakuni Marine Corp Air Station X     X X 
Sasebo Naval Base   X X     
Okinawa 
Kadena AB X X   X X 
Korea 
United States Army Garrison 
(USAG) Red Cloud           
USAG Yongsan           
USAG Humphreys X       X 
USAG Daegu X X X   X 
Osan AB X     X(C-12)   
Kunsan AB X         
Table 1.   AOR Asset Matrix4 
 
 Based on the criteria summarized in the AOR asset matrix, Yokosuka/Yokota AB 
is the recommended AOR distribution hub location for PACOM.  This location maintains 
the necessary infrastructure, transportation, and cold-chain needs for vaccine distribution.  
Yokota AB is also desirable for this role as it includes the only airlift wing in PACOM 
(DoD, 2007c). 
                                                 
4 AOR Asset Matrix is populated using publicly available data regarding PACOM installations in 
South Korea, Japan, and Okinawa.  The following websites are used: 
http://www.usfk.mil/USFK/index.html, http://www.usfj.mil/, http://www.pacom.mil/, 
http://www.pacaf.af.mil/.  August, 2007.  Cold-chain training level and supplies availability are sourced to 
Dana Dallas via personal communication. 
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D. INTRA-AOR DISTRIBUTION 
 As noted above, regional stability and infrastructure concerns heavily dictate the 
transportation methods selected for use within the AOR.  Further limitations arise from 
geographical concerns.  PACOM presents unique geographical limitations based on the 
number of islands, rugged topography, and limited road access of some areas.  While 
some of these limitations apply specifically to PACOM, similar concerns arise in other 
AORs.  These common constraints dictate the universal need for selecting airlift as the 
Intra-AOR transportation mode.   
 Intra-AOR airlift distribution can be broken into two major categories based on 
the type of aircraft needed to support the mission requirements: fixed-wing cargo planes 
for long-range or high-population support, or rotary-wing helicopters for short-range 
support.  For this model, the aircraft considered for use would be limited to the C-130 and 
H-60.  C-130 planning assumptions5 are as follows (US Air Force, 2007): 
• Range: 1,000 nautical miles 
• Normal Payload: 34,000 pounds 
• Speed: 300 knots. 
H-60 planning assumptions6 are as follows (US Navy, 2007): 
• Range: 380 nautical miles 
• Normal Payload: 2,600 pounds 
• Speed: 180 knots. 
Due to airfield availability, geography, and security considerations, several 
installations would necessitate C-130 support from Yokota AB.  These bases include  
 
 
                                                 
5 Planning assumptions are derived from the most limiting of each factor for the various models of C-
130 in service.   
6 Planning assumptions are derived from Navy Fact file for H-60. 
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Misawa, Iwakuni, Kadena, and Osan.  While the decision to use C-130 support is dictated 
by distance, the C-130 also maximizes the amount of vaccine transported while 
minimizing transit time.   
Iwakuni would provide follow-on support to Sasebo Naval Base with organic 
helicopter assets.  Sasebo Naval Base presents a challenge common among many DoD 
locations: no airfield exists onboard the installation.  This lack of airfield mandates the 
use of helicopter support.  While use of existing helipads or designated landing areas is 
desirable, there are several large parking lots and rooftops that could possibly facilitate a 
helicopter landing; however, an exact landing site would have to be evaluated and 
selected by a properly trained flight crew. 
 Osan is selected as the Korean distribution hub based on its central location.  In 
addition, with the 731st Air Mobility Squadron located at this location, Osan is already 
established for regional logistics support (DoD, 2007b).  If further cold-chain support is 
needed at this location, this can be provided by the 16th Medical Logistics Battalion 
located at Camp Carroll, Republic of Korea (DoD, 2007a).  Airlift capability within 
Korea can be provided by numerous commands currently utilizing variants of the H-60 
helicopter as directed by United States Forces Korea.  All current military locations in 
Korea are within the 380-mile range of the H-60.  Area commanders should continue the 
use of H-60s to distribute to the numerous outlying commands and posts. 
 The resultant PACOM distribution network for Korea and Japan is shown 
graphically below.  The yellow arrows denote C-130 routes from Yokota Air Base.  The 
red arrows denote H-60 helicopter routes from Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station and 





Figure 10.   PACOM Distribution Network 
E. EXECUTION 
With the cold supply chain presented above, focus must now shift to the 
anticipated execution of this plan.  Several key factors necessary for the success of this 
plan exist: communication, transportation time, and storage.  Each of these is discussed 
here.  Also, a template for execution of this plan is provided below. 
Communication.  From the initial command to execute this plan, communication 
is of foremost concern.  In order to ensure the proper number of vaccine doses are 
secured and delivered, commands must expeditiously and accurately report the current 
number of personnel assigned to their command.   This should be accomplished through 
normal reporting channels within the chain of command, culminating at the COCOM.  
The COCOM would then report these aggregate results to the DLA in order to secure the 
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proper amount of vaccine.  Also, the COCOM would deliver results to the COCOM 
distribution hub.  The information provided to the distribution hub should not be 
aggregated in order to better facilitate accurate repacking upon receipt of vaccine. 
Transportation time.  Rapid transportation time is essential when passive 
containers are being moved between active storage locations.  Transit time between 
active storage locations cannot exceed the validated container time.  This is especially of 
concern in intra-AOR distribution.  Once repack is complete at the COCOM distribution 
hub, the journey to the in-theatre end-user begins.  This transit needs to occur as rapidly 
as possible as there are no in-transit storage locations designed into this model.  By 
utilizing air travel, this concern is mitigated, but container time will still need to be 
monitored until the doses are administered or transferred to another form of refrigeration 
on site. 
Storage.  While a vaccine is in transit within theatre, active storage locations 
would not be utilized; however, end-user storage capacity must be evaluated.  End-user 
active storage capacity must be sufficient to provide for all expected vaccine doses.  
Along with capacity, active storage units must be able to adequately provide the required 
temperature range for pandemic influenza vaccine.  These two criteria of capacity and 
capability can and should be evaluated ahead of time by end-user commands and be 
reported to COCOM.  By accomplishing this evaluation early, commanders can alleviate 
one possible problem before this model must be executed.  If active storage capacity 
and/or capability are found to be insufficient, better-suited refrigerators shall be secured 
through normal procurement channels. The successful completion of this procurement 







DLA COCOM Regional Commands 
Verify vaccine needed. Secure shipper via 
USTRANSCOM. Communicate vaccine and 
supply needs to COCOM. 
Verify vaccine needed. Determine aircraft and 
sortie count needed at 
regional hub. 
Verify needed/available 
cold-chain supplies at 
repack/distro hub. 
Communicate vaccine and 
supply needs to the DLA. 
Determine aircraft and 
sortie count needed at hub. 
Secure needed aircraft and 
aircrew. 
Pre-stage vaccine repack 
supplies. 
Secure vaccine and 
needed supplies. 
Ship vaccine/supplies 
to COCOM distro hub. 
Vaccine arrives at hub. 
Secure needed regional 
aircraft and aircrew. 
Store and repack. Ensure 
repacked per destination 
and quantity needed. 
Vaccine arrives at regional 
hub. Verify arrival at hub, 
including verification 
of TT4 device. 
Store in refers/ 
refrigerators.  Verify TT4 
temps.  Report temp issues 
to COCOM/DLA. 
Provide technical 
assistance to commands 
as needed. 
 
Ship to regional 
commands. 
 
Distribute to subordinate 
commands. 
Denotes key steps in the communication process.  Accurate and timely 
communication is essential to ensure the proper numbers of vaccines and cold supplies 
are secured for use in theatre. 
Denotes key steps in the transportation process.  Total time out of active storage 
facilities must be less than the validated passive container time to prevent loss of vaccine. 
Table 2.   Execution Sequence 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter provides a decision-making model for designing a vaccine cold-
supply chain into a military AOR.  This model considers airfield availability, cold-chain 
infrastructure, and military airlift capability—essential elements for executing a timely 
vaccine distribution network within foreign territories.  Also discussed in this chapter is a 
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V. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. MODEL APPLICATION AS A UNIVERSAL PLANNING TOOL 
The AOR Asset Matrix discussed in Chapter IV provides a framework for 
evaluating the essential assets available within any given AOR, and is shown below in 
Table 3.  This is the primary tool for selecting the AOR distribution hub.  All AOR 
installations are listed in the first column, with subsequent columns used to annotate the 
availability of the assets identified in this study as essential to the successful distribution 
of pre-pandemic influenza vaccine. 
 




Supplies Cargo Aircraft Helos 
A X X X X X 
B  X    
C   X   
D X   X X 
Table 3.   AOR Asset Matrix 
Distribution hub selection is then based on the location with maximum asset 
availability.  In the above scenario, the hub would be placed at Installation A.  If none of 
the installations evaluated meet the criteria for hub selection, the grouping size should be 
increased until an adequate hub can be found.  Once the hub is selected, follow-on 
transportation methods must be decided.  The transportation method decision should be 
based on the distance of installations from the distribution hub.  If the follow-on 
installations are within the range of available helicopter assets, this should be the 
preferred method.  If the follow-on installations are not within available helicopter 
capabilities, fixed-wing cargo aircraft should be used for transportation.  Fixed-wing 
aircraft require the use of adequate airfield facilities.  If such facilities are not available, 
contingency operations such as multiple-leg helicopter routes must be evaluated for use. 
A final key consideration that must be addressed when applying this model is how 
to group installations.  The first natural grouping in joint military operations is at the 
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COCOM level.  This grouping divides the operational assets among the highest level 
operational commanders.  Within COCOMs, the next logical split is among geographical 
commanders.  For example, within PACOM, joint commands such as Joint Forces Korea 
and Joint Forces Japan provide a logical next division.  Further grouping and division 
should be accomplished as each unique AOR demands.  Factors such as personnel 
density, geography, and infrastructure for administering the vaccine must be considered 
by regional-level planners.  Finally, COCOMs must ensure that an adequate number of 
distribution hubs are selected so as not to over-extend the capabilities of any one hub, 
and, thereby, break down the entire system. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
An influenza pandemic could impair the military’s readiness, jeopardize ongoing 
military operations abroad, and threaten the day-to-day functioning of the DoD due to a 
large percentage of sick or absent personnel.  Our study found the following conclusions: 
• The DoD is heavily dependent upon commercial vendors to provide the 
distribution of cold-chain assets. 
• The DoD does not currently have the organic capability to provide a viable 
cold-chain distribution network. 
• The DoD has been mandated by the National Implementation Guide to 
develop a distribution strategy.  Our research shows there is currently no 
existing plan that encompasses the total distribution network from existing 
stockpile to distribution by the COCOM. 
• There is a lack of communication and coordination across the DoD in the 
planning of the distribution strategy.  The burden of the planning has been 
placed upon the COCOMs, with factors such as limited detailed guidance and 
reliance on military services for medical material hindering their planning 
efforts. 
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• Unity of effort does not yet exist. The many COCOMs’ current distribution 
strategies for a pandemic influenza situation are not standardized and have not 
been practiced through practical application. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Moving forward from this study, we recommend each COCOM rapidly develop a 
distribution plan for pre-pandemic influenza vaccine.  This study can be used as a driving 
template for all COCOMs, thus ensuring that all distribution plans are established using 
common criteria.  Regardless of the planning tool used to design the distribution process, 
all COCOMs and stakeholders should use the same planning tool to ensure unity of 
effort.  Furthermore, standardized cold-chain training developed by the DLA must be 
promulgated to all levels within the distribution network. 
Once a distribution process is agreed upon and put in place, this process must be 
utilized.  Like all large military operations, pandemic influenza prevention requires 
planning and practice are essential to success.  It is naïve to believe that we, as a military 
force, can successfully vaccinate our personnel in a pandemic environment without first 
operationally testing and exercising the system.  All COCOMs must develop and execute 
training exercises designed to test and evaluate the probable success of the vaccine cold 
chain put forth.  Table-top exercises are not sufficient to test a system of this magnitude.  
Failure to properly verify the ability of this process to maintain cold-chain integrity could 
result in the loss of thousands of lives, and potentially threaten our national security. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Further study is needed to determine the need for security forces to protect and 
ensure the continuity of the distribution process.  Along the same lines, further study is 
recommended to determine any effects of a pandemic situation on international relations 
and the subsequent effects on our ability to provide vaccine to military personnel in 
foreign countries.  Also, a study of the potential for forward-deployment storage of 
pandemic vaccine would be beneficial.  Finally, it is highly recommended that a study be 
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conducted to select the proper location and quantity of vaccination centers in order to 
efficiently and safely vaccinate patients, whether military or civilian. 
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APPENDIX  
Shipping Specifications (DLA, 2007a): 
Insulated Shipping Container Specifications: 
Model        Size         Cargo Space Dimensions           External  Dimensions 
E-36-2       Small       10 3/4” L x 6 1/2” W x 4” H        15 1/2” L x 12” W x 14” H  
E-65          Medium   12” L x 6 1/2” W x 6 1/2” H         18 ½” L x 12 ½” W x 17 ½” H 
E-186        Large       18” L x 14 1/2” W x 12” H          16 ½” L x 12” W x 7” H  
E-327        Extra Large   22 ½” L x 19” W x 17 ½” H   24” L x  24” W x  24” H 
 
Polar Packs (Refrigerant): 
Size                   Weight                 Dimensions (in inches) 
Medium             24 oz                   8 x 6 x 1 ¼” 
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